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Debate as to the relationship between law and power in Russia has long focused on the 
study of hard power. Adopting the work done on soft power in the sphere of American 
political science, and as part of a legal analysis, we wish to show that Russia has also 
developed her own soft power based in part on a strategy of normative influence. Law 
is thus part of a trend in regaining power that has previously been lost. Admittedly this 
strategy is not, in itself, the preserve of Russia, as is shown by the European Union’s own 
use of the same approach. The fact remains, however, that there are aspects specific to 
Russia. Indeed, it may be possible to isolate three types of normative influence in Russia, 
the construction of which is linked, in part, to her history. Firstly, there is the normative 
legacy of the Soviet Union. A direct consequence of history, Russia has set about making 
that legacy bear fruit or, at the very least, ensuring that it is not fundamentally challenged. 
Secondly, and particularly by relying on the CIS’s institutional and political springboards, 
Russia has succeeded in promoting the normative alignment of those countries that she 
seeks to influence, which we have termed the promotion of normative convergence. 
Thirdly, and with greater vigour, Russia now promotes a veritable normative expansion 
that is increasingly based on a fait accompli rather than persuasion. These are the three 
types of influence that we propose to examine in this article, limiting the legal analysis 
to two countries that are directly concerned with this strategy: Ukraine and Belarus.
Keywords: normative influence; normative expansion; regional integration; Customs 
Union; EurAsEC; CIS; Ukraine; Belarus; comparative law.
doI: 10.17589/2309-8678-2015-3-1-6-32
1  As this article was written in July 2013, we could not foresee what would later happen in ukraine 
in 2014. the few developments based on the state of law prior to the new situation have, however, 
been retained, insofar as these illustrate the techniques and the progressiveness of russia’s normative 
influence over ukraine. All my thanks to rachael singh, Lawyer Linguist, university of Bordeaux, for the 
assistance in translation of this paper from the French into the English language.
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1. Introduction
studies conducted in recent years on the issue of emergence, and more specifically 
the emergence of russia, are generally conducted in a non-legal field. work by 
economists, political scientists or even specialists in international relations has thus 
narrowed the scope of the research.2 Jurists are increasingly few – and therefore 
all the more valuable – in the field. this lack is probably due to the ambiguity of 
emergence as a concept. Although very recent3 and not very juridical, it is not entirely 
devoid of interest. It is a rich concept, offering a different understanding of the 
relationship between law and power in the specific context of russia.
the relationship that the russian state maintains with its law has long been, and 
perhaps continues to be as one with power. this is not illegitimate at first glance, 
insofar as the law is one of the key tools available to public authority; indeed, for some, 
it is the distinguishing feature of state sovereignty conceived as being ‘the monopoly 
to decree positive law.’4 the specificity of russian law, however, is that its relationship 
with power is circular, and that it is not supported by other legitimizing concepts, 
such as that of the public service or special measures in France.5 In other words, there 
is in russia a concept of the autopoietic / self-creating nature of power, wherein it is 
the foundation of the law and legitimizes it, while the law is an instrument of power 
and legitimizes it in return. Law is therefore conceived, in russia, essentially as an 
instrument of state action and dominion.6 this historic and continued connection 
2  Cf. in French: L’enjeu mondial. Les pays émergents (Christophe Jaffrelot, éd.) (Presses de sciences-Po 
2008) (we refer you specifically to the chapter on russia, which is really the transcript of a debate); 
L’émergence de nouvelles puissances: vers un système multipolaire? Afrique du sud, Brésil, Chine, Inde, 
Mexique, russie (sebastian santander, éd.) (Ellipses 2009); david teurtrie, géopolitique de la russie. 
Intégration régionale, enjeux énergétiques, influence culturelle (L’harmattan 2010); Moscou et le monde. 
L’ambition de la grandeur: une illusion? (Anne de tinguy, éd.) (Autrement 2008); cf. in English: Martin A. 
smith, Power in the Changing global order: the us, russia and China (Polity Press 2012); russia’s Identity 
in International relations: Images, Perceptions, Misperceptions (raymond taras, éd.) (routledge 2012); 
Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and geopolitics: rivalry or Partnership for China, russia and Central Asia? 
(robert E. Bedeski & Niklas swanström, eds.) (routledge 2012); the European union, russia and the 
shared Neighbourhood (Jackie gower & graham timmins, eds.) (routledge 2011); russia: the Challenges 
of transformation (Piotr dutkiewicz & dmitri trenin, eds.) (New york university Press 2011).
3  In English, ‘emerging markets’ are often mentioned. In russian, the term ‘bystro razvivayushchayasya 
strana’ is sometimes used, which roughly translates as ‘fast-developing country.’
4  olivier Beaud, La puissance de l’État 130 (PuF 1994).
5  Incidentally, we refer you to the article by M.-E. Baudoin (Marie-Élisabeth Baudoin, Les cultures post-
soviétiques face au droit, 2006 revue d’études politiques et constitutionnelles Est-européennes 73). 
Furthermore, if we examine russian administrative law textbooks, the authors generally study the functions 
of administrative law and its principles without presenting the theories that would legitimize the state’s 
administrative actions. the state’s administrative activities must be understood as the legal extension of 
the dominance of russian policymakers from the executive branch (cf. Агапов А.Б. Административное 
право: Учебник [Agapov A.B. Administrativnoe pravo: Uchebnik [Andrey B. Agapov, Administrative Law: 
textbook]] 32 f. (6th ed., yurait 2009)). on special measures in French public law as a legitimizing concept, 
cf. Elodie saillant, L’exorbitance en droit public (= 109 Nouvelle bibliothèque de thèses) (dalloz 2011).
6  this statement must, however, be now relativized (cf. Baudoin, supra n. 5).
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between law and power therefore allows us to formulate a theory whereby law is 
a medium – if not key then at least a significant one – in russia’s strategy to regain 
her standing as a great state. while, from a russian perspective, that standing must 
be won back in the eyes of the world,7 she must first, and more modestly, target 
those countries with which she has shared part of her history: the ‘near-abroad.’ 
this seems all the more legitimate as emergence must first be understood from an 
extrinsic point of view, in relation to otherness, and is consequently characterized 
by its relativity and contingency.
russia’s use of the law as an instrument to support its strategy of power vis-à-
vis third parties is tricky. A state’s normative influence ought, logically, to be limited 
to that of its general influence and / or its history, which would have made it an 
example to be followed.8 the principle of legal territoriality would thus counter more 
direct, more restrictive influence such as that of territorial expansion by annexation. 
Nevertheless, we know that the rationae loci limitations of law to the national territory 
can be given a broad interpretation as is demonstrated, for instance, by criminal law9 
or competition law.10 Furthermore, this strategy of power via the law is frequently 
employed and is not the preserve of russia; it concerns the European union most of 
all. Cut off from those attributes associated with hard power,11 the Eu is often qualified 
as a ‘soft power’12 or a ‘normative power.’13 It is true that the union has developed 
7  this is the thinking behind the rise of the BrICs group, so ardently desired by russia. so much so, 
in fact, that the russian Foreign Ministry – more specifically its National Committee for research on 
BrICs – has created the BRICS Bulletin, published monthly.
8  on the idea of constitutional model, cf. Marie-Claire Ponthoreau, droit(s) constitutionnel(s) comparé(s) 
187 f. (Economica 2010).
9  Cf. situations of passive criminal jurisdiction, even the (controversial) cases of universal jurisdiction and 
in particular the Yerodia case (Case Concerning the Arrest warrant (democratic republic of the Congo 
v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14), available at <http://iilj.org/courses/documents/theyerodiacaseedt.
pdf> (accessed Mar. 6, 2015)).
10  Cf. European union law since, in particular, the renowned Pâte de bois decision and the theory of 
anti-competitive effects (Case 129/85, Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v. Commission of the European 
Communities, 1988 E.C.r. 5193).
11  one could never tire of re-reading the partial, biased and approximate analyses by r. kagan (robert 
kagan, La puissance et la faiblesse (Plon 2003)). the more one reads him, the more one gets the impression 
that the desire for peace is understood as an admission – or worse, an intention – of weakness.
12  European institutions sometimes refer to this explicitly, not to characterize the nature of European 
power but rather in relation to its specific strategy in the cultural sphere (cf. Promoting Cultural 
and Creative sectors for growth and Jobs in the Eu, CoM(2012) 537 final, at <http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/registre/docs_autres_institutions/commission_europeenne/com/2012/0537/CoM_
CoM%282012%290537_EN.pdf> (accessed Mar. 6, 2015)). this intention to bolster the soft-power 
dimension is a desire on the part of the European Parliament (cf. European Parliament resolution of 
19 February 2009 on the role of NAto in the security Architecture of the Eu (2008/2197(INI)), ¶ 19, 2010 
o.J. (C 76 E) 69, 73; European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2011 on Eu External Policies in Favour of 
democratisation (2011/2032(INI)), ¶ 3, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getdoc.do?pubref=-//
EP//NoNsgML+tA+P7-tA-2011-0334+0+doC+PdF+V0//EN> (accessed Mar. 6, 2015).
13  hedley Bull, Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 21(2) Journal of Common Market 
studies (1982) doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1982.tb00866.x; tuomas Forsberg, Normative Power Europe, 
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a real strategy for exporting its own norms, a deliberate strategy which is now an 
integral part of its identity on the international stage. the strategy has taken various 
courses / paths, giving priority to the conventional route,14 but without excluding 
unilateralism.15 In a different way, and in a separate historical context, France has also 
played the normative influence (even normative expansion) card: first, and almost 
naturally, owing to her colonial past; secondly, and more deliberately, in trying to 
safeguard the achievements of that same colonial past.
russia’s position is more particular: not because russia is particular by her very 
essence (which she is just as much as other states) but rather because her history, 
following the collapse of the soviet union, has led her to a different conception 
of the techniques and purpose of normative influence. Indeed, that normative 
influence emerged only belatedly for two reasons. on the one hand, the difficulties 
that russia faced were so serious and extensive that she could not afford the luxury 
of developing a normative influence strategy on a par with that of the European 
union.16 on the other hand, russia had initially given priority to those instruments 
related to hard power rather than soft power in order to rebuild her power. russia has 
therefore only very gradually added legal influence to her hard power techniques.
Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type, 49(6) Journal of Common Market studies (2011) 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02194.x; Ian Manners, Normative Power in Europe: A Contradiction in 
Terms?, 40(2) Journal of Common Market studies (2002) doi:10.1111/1468-5965.00353. For Manners, 
such normative power consists in having the ability to shape what is normal and what is not. It is 
therefore a broad conception of the notion and the author therefore does not merely concern himself 
with the promotion of norms but also with ‘normative ways.’
14  the union’s use of the well-known conditionality clauses in its association agreements is one of 
the most striking examples. Add to this the many European requirements imposed on candidate 
states so that the latter will incorporate all secondary legislation into their own national law prior to 
their accession to the union. the ENP is yet another example of this normative power formalised in 
‘para-conventional’ instruments. Finally, mention must be made of the union’s activities in the field 
of private international law. thus, to illustrate, the 1968 Brussels Convention, agreed / ratified by 
all Member states and relative to judicial jurisdiction and the enforcement of decisions in civil and 
commercial matter, was adopted and ‘communitarised’ by the Brussels I regulations 2000. the 2007 
Lugano Convention adopted and extended the content of the Brussels I regulations to non-Member 
states, particularly those in the EEE. generally, and for a transversal and thorough approach, cf. Cécile 
rapoport, Les partenariats entre l’union européenne et les États tiers européens (Bruylant 2011).
15  the union’s unilateral normative expansionism can be seen particularly clearly in competition law. It 
must be added that, in aviation matters, the union’s unilateral activism is just as abundant. Examples 
include directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
Amending directive 2003/87/EC so As to Include Aviation Activities in the scheme for greenhouse 
gas Emission Allowance trading within the Community, 2009 o.J. (L 8) 3, the full effects of which 
were deployed on January 1, 2012, and included aviation in the Community’s scheme for greenhouse 
gas emission allowance trading. this decision was heavily criticised by the united states and China, 
the latter even threatening to reduce the number of orders it had with Airbus. For a more detailed 
discussion on this point, cf. Vincent Correia, L’union européenne et l’ordre international de l’aviation 
civile 891 f. (Bruylant 2012).
16  It first had to guarantee its own domestic normative coherence. the attitude of the seething tatarstan 
in the 1990s, and Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric on the ‘vertical power structure’ and the ‘dictatorship of the 
law’ are the most meaningful examples.
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As with any soft power process, normative influence (which, by its very nature, 
is difficult to grasp) is resistant to any legal approach. An attempt can, however, be 
made at a definition. we may consider that it is the normative activity of a subject 
of international law that results, wittingly or unwittingly, in another subject of 
international law amending its national law in a specific sense. Admittedly, this 
deliberately broad definition does not challenge / call into question its nature, which 
is diffuse to say the least. this is no handicap in reality, as it allows us to understand 
the range of legal techniques that russia has employed, one of the purposes of which 
would be to rebuild / regain her power. Indeed, such normative influence is not 
a monolithic block, but rather comprises three dimensions that are incremental: the 
soviet normative legacy, normative convergence and normative expansion. First of all, 
the legacy is not, properly speaking, the influence of russian law as it is only the result 
of the history and collapse of the soviet union. this does not mean to say, however, 
that the latter is part of the strategy of normative influence insofar as, if a legacy can be 
squandered, everything may also be done in order to safeguard it by means of proper 
management – even by due diligence. such a legacy thus loses some its passive nature 
and a subjective dimension tinged with voluntarism is included therein. secondly, 
normative convergence is the result of a process of normative interaction between 
legal systems based on shared values and / or a shared history. the convergence 
goes beyond pure national voluntarism and is a part of a normative network which, 
systemically or protosystemically and to some extent, objectivizes it. Consequently, 
fitting normative convergence into a national strategy to restore power – a purely 
voluntarist action by definition – may seem specious. yet again, however, this is not 
to be excluded immediately, although it is true that the convergence supposes that 
some impetus will be given at a particular point so that the systemic drive towards 
convergence can begin and, thereafter, be maintained. It is to that extent that the 
phenomenon of normative convergence, leading to a kind of normative alignment, 
may fall within the scope of a russian strategy of legal influence. third and finally, the 
normative expansion must be considered as the most complete form of normative 
influence. It consists in the imposition, by means of more or less explicit coercion, of 
a legal rule on third parties. while it is true that, formally, this normative expansion is 
not systematically unilateral,17 its defining characteristic is coercion. russia’s use of this 
superior form of legal influence, as a complement to her hard power, is more recent. 
In light of the interest this technique holds for the russian authorities, it is likely that 
they will resort to it more and more frequently in future.
these three techniques constitute a scale of normative influence and russia 
has implemented them only very gradually. In this respect, it is striking to note that 
their use exactly mirrors russia’s growing power and her aspirations to become 
a great state once again. In other words, in the early 1990s, she could only settle for 
17  Cf. the conditionality clauses inserted into agreements with the European union.
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managing the soviet legacy, in conjunction with former soviet states. In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, she strove to be the pulse of a normative convergence between 
those countries, particularly by using the Commonwealth of Independent states 
[hereinafter CIs] as leverage. since that time, russia has not hesitated in exporting, 
much more directly and conspicuously, her own law to countries ‘near-abroad,’ 
relying especially on the Eurasian Economic Community [hereinafter EurAsEC]. It 
should be pointed out that recourse to those three techniques has come about in 
stages and is not exclusive in the sense that one would preclude the others. In other 
words, russia now combines these three forms of legal influence and uses them 
in a complementary manner within one strategy while, if not conscious, is at least 
under construction.
It must be said that the field covered by the purpose of this research is particularly 
vast and, so to speak, out of proportion. the analyses put forward will therefore 
necessarily be partial. Furthermore, it is essential, in order to avoid any scientific 
pitfalls, to establish the geographical perimeter of the research. thus, russia’s 
normative influence vis à vis Belarus and ukraine alone will be examined here. 
this choice is based on three considerations. Firstly, the two latter countries are 
close enough to justify a study that brings them together: with their admittedly 
soviet past, they are also both parties to the CIs18 and the free-trade area agreed on 
october 18, 2011.19 secondly, ukraine and Belarus are different enough for them to 
be the subject of a shared analysis: their political regimes have followed separate 
trajectories and their respective memberships of institutionalised co-operation 
zones along with russia are not exactly identical.20 Finally, these two countries form 
18  the CIs treaty was ratified by the decree of Belarus supreme Council on 10 december 1991 
(Постановление Верховного Совета Республики Беларусь от 10 декабря 1991 г. № 1296-XII 
«О ратификации Соглашения об образовании Содружества Независимых Государств» [Postanovlenie 
Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Belarus’ ot 10 dekabrya 1991 g. No. 1296-XII ‘O ratifikatsii Soglasheniya ob 
obrazovanii Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv’ [decree of Belarus supreme Council No. 1296-XII 
of december 10, 1991, ‘on ratification of the Agreement on Creation of Commonwealth of sovereign 
republics’]]), and on the same date by the decree of Verkhovna rada of ukraine (Постановление 
Верховной Рады Украины от 10 декабря 1991 г. № 1958-XII «О ратификации Соглашения о создании 
Содружества Независимых Государств» [Postanovlenie Verhovnoi Rady Ukrainy ot 10 dekabrya 1991 g. 
No. 1958-XII ‘O ratifikatsii Soglasheniya o sozdanii Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv’ [decree of 
Verkhovna rada of ukraine No. 1958-XII of december 10, 1991, ‘on ratification of the Agreement on 
Creation of Commonwealth of sovereign republics’]]).
19  this treaty, signed in saint Petersburg on october 18, 2001, was officially ratified by Belarus on May 
26, 2012 [Закон Республики Беларусь от 26 мая 2012 № 381-З «О ратификации Договора о зоне 
свободной торговли» [Zakon Respubliki Belarus’ ot 26 maya 2012 g. No. 381-Z ‘O ratifikatsii Dogovora 
o zone svobodnoi torgovli’ [Law of the republic of Belarus No. 381-Z of May 26, 2012, ‘on ratification 
of the treaty on Creation of the Free-trade Area’]]) and by ukraine on August 9, 2012 (Закон Украины 
от 9 августа 2012 г. № 5193-VI «О ратификации Договора о зоне свободной торговли» [Zakon 
Ukrainy ot 9 avgusta 2012 g. No. 5193-VI ‘O ratifikatsii Dogovora o zone svobodnoi torgovli’ [Law of ukraine 
No. 5193-VI of August 9, 2012, ‘on ratification of the treaty on Creation of the Free-trade Area’]]).
20  ukraine only has observer status in EurAsEC and is therefore not part of the Customs union. 
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part of russian’s western border / frontier, a ‘shared neighbourhood area’ with the 
European union.21
All efforts will thus be made, in a properly legal standpoint, to reinstate this 
progressiveness and the combination of normative influence techniques. on a limited 
scale, these started out as the straightforward good management of the normative 
legacy (sec. 2), then focused on the promotion of normative convergence (sec. 3) 
before resulting in the current boost being given to a true normative expansion 
(sec. 4). 
2. The Proper Management of the Normative Legacy
the collapse of the soviet union, independent of the considerable human, 
political and constitutional difficulties that ensued, was a period of transition. 
that transition was not only economic and political, but also legal. Indeed, it was 
impossible, in such short timeframes, to re-draft all the laws governing legal life and 
transactions. For many years, the law applicable was therefore that of the former 
republics22 and it is only recently that the codification process has at least partly 
reached its conclusion.23 In such circumstances, it cannot be said that this transitional 
phase constitutes the expression of russia’s normative influence over ukrainian or 
Belarusian law, but must instead be qualified simply as a legacy.
Nevertheless, over the course of the transition period, russian actively set about 
to preserve that legacy. the aim – to protect the interests of the russian Federation 
in countries ‘near-abroad’ – was an eminently strategic one and quite logically took 
concrete form through the medium of the law. It is therefore no longer a matter for 
ukraine and Belarus of simply being the beneficiaries of such a legacy; it falls instead 
to russian to make it bear fruit and incorporate a degree of voluntarism therein. the 
latter is expressed, most particularly, in an increase in the number of legal acts that 
are extraterritorial in scope, with regard to two sections of the population: civilian 
(sec. 2.1) and military (sec. 2.2).
2.1. Preserving the Civil Legacy
the dislocation of the soviet union was the underlying cause of an unprecedented 
diaspora. Many russians now found themselves in independent and third-party 
states that were legally separate from the Fatherland. russia was thus deprived of 
21  Cf. hugo Flavier, Le voisinage commun de l’Union européenne et de la Russie, in L’Europe face au monde 
199 f. (Loïc grard, éd.) (Pedone 2013).
22  For a transversal and constitutional analysis of this transition, cf. Marie-Elisabeth Baudoin, Justice 
constitutionnelle et État post-soviétique 115 f. (Pu Clermont-Ferrand 2005).
23  the russian Civil Code was only completed in 2006, the ukrainian Civil Code – in 2003, the Belarusian 
Civil Code – in 1998. the ukrainian Criminal Code was overhauled in 2001, the russian Criminal Code – 
in 1996, and the Belarusian Criminal Code – in 1999.
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a significant part of a population that had a ‘natural’ vocation to reside within her vast 
territory. Not without a certain political dexterity, russia made an asset of what could 
otherwise have been an impediment. on May 24, 1999, completing a process that 
had begun in 1994, the Federal Law was passed.24 the fundamentally extraterritorial 
nature of the Federal Law No. 99-FZ emerges not only in the scope of its application, 
but also in the concrete action envisaged therein.
As regards the scope of application of the Federal Law No. 99-FZ, we cannot help 
but notice the reference made to the concept of ‘compatriot,’ previously unseen 
amongst the ranks of those usually employed.25 Intuitively, we quickly perceive the 
opportunity presented by the choice of such an obscure term as a condition for 
the applicability of the Federal Law No. 99-FZ. that intuition is confirmed by the 
definition it provides for russian ‘compatriots.’ under the terms of Art. 1, these are 
‘persons born in a state and residing or having resided in the same and who have 
the shared features of language, history, cultural heritage, traditions and customs, 
and equally the direct descendants of such persons.’ It goes on to identify who such 
‘compatriots from overseas’ are. A compatriot from overseas is ‘a citizen of the russian 
Federation, residing permanently beyond the borders of the russian Federation,’ 
but also ‘persons and their descendants residing beyond the borders of the russian 
Federation and who maintain, as a general rule, relationships with populations 
residing historically within the territory of the russian Federation, together with 
persons who have freely made the choice to have spiritual, cultural and legal ties 
with the russian Federation.’ It also concerns ‘persons whose direct kin lived within 
the territory of the russian Federation’ and ‘in particular:
24  Federal Law No. 99-FZ of May 24, 1999, ‘on the National Policy of the russian Federation in her 
relations with Compatriots from overseas’ [Федеральный закон от 24 мая 1999 г. № 99-ФЗ 
«О государственной политике Российской Федерации в отношении соотечественников 
за рубежом» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 24 maya 1999 g. No. 99-FZ ‘O gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubezhom’]] [hereinafter Federal Law No. 99-FZ]. It is 
true that the latter may be seen as coming too late. the truth is that it is the result of a much older 
process; owing to the internal political and economic difficulties that russia faced at the time, the 
1990s were not propitious for intense legislative activity. the Federal Law No. 99-FZ was adopted 
following government decree No. 590 of May 17, 1996, ‘on the Programme of Measures Aimed at 
supporting Compatriots overseas’ [Постановление Правительства РФ от 17 мая 1996 г. № 590 
«О программе мер по поддержке соотечественников за рубежом» [Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva 
RF ot 17 maya 1996 No. 590 ‘O programme mer po podderzhke sootechestvennikov za rubezhom’]], 
which itself was passed on the basis of the russian Federation Presidential decree (the famous 
edicts) No. 1681 of August 11, 1994, ‘on the Fundamental guidelines for the russian Federation’s 
National Policy on Compatriots Living overseas’ [Указ Президента РФ от 11 августа 1994 г. № 1681 
«Об основных направлениях государственной политики Российской Федерации в отношении 
соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом» [Ukaz Prezidenta RF ot 11 avgusta 1994 g. No. 1681 ‘Ob 
osnovnykh napravleniyakh gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov, 
prozhivayushchikh za rubezhom’]].
25  In this area, the normative texts concern ‘nationals,’ or ‘citizens.’ on the exploration of the concept of 
‘quasi-nationals,’ cf. sébastien touzé, La «quasi nationalité», réflexions générales sur une notion hybride, 
115(1) revue générale de droit international public (2011).
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persons who were citizens of the ussr, residing in a state that was a member 
of the ussr and who have obtained citizenship of those states or have become 
stateless persons;
emigrants from the russian state, the russian republic of the soviet union or the 
russian Federation who held the corresponding citizenship and who have become 
citizens of a foreign state or stateless persons.’
the choice of these terms on the part of the russian legislature go beyond mere 
reference to legal standards offering a broad margin of interpretation; these are the 
very haziest terms and concepts that give an almost limitless scope to the Federal 
Law No. 99-FZ.
In this same vein of extraterritoriality, the concrete action envisaged by the federal 
legislature are no less instructive as to russia’s ambitions.26 Admittedly, some provisions 
may be viewed as worthy phrases that do not constitute any kind of undertaking for 
their author.27 there are, however, others that appear far more intrusive.28 such is the 
case, in particular, for Art. 5(2), which provides substantively that ‘compatriots’ have 
the right to establish ‘cultural and national autonomies,’ together with ‘mass media and 
participate in the activities of the same.’  the amendment brought on July 23, 2010, 
slightly extended the boundaries of Art. 5: ‘compatriots’ now have the right to use ‘the 
russian language and the mother-tongues of the peoples of the russian Federation 
in order to develop their spiritual and intellectual potential,’ and to establish ‘religious 
organisations of compatriots.’29 Admittedly, it goes without saying that a state may 
not unilaterally impose obligations on third parties by means of a ‘heteronormative’ 
act30 and that, therefore, the legal consequences of such extraterritoriality must be 
26  Furthermore, these feature very clearly in the Federal Law No. 99-FZ. we may cite one example, Art. 14(2), 
under which ‘[t]he defence of the fundamental rights and freedoms of man and the citizen concerning 
compatriots forms an indefeasible part of russian foreign policy.’ the legislature also provided that 
compatriots have the right to ‘freely choose, protect and develop their identity, to support and 
develop their spiritual and intellectual potential.’
27  In particular, Art. 5(2) under which, particularly ‘[t]he national policy of the russian Federation with 
regard to compatriots is founded on the principles of:
the inalienability and accession of all, from birth, to the fundamental rights and freedoms of man 
and the citizen;
the duty for all states to respect the general principles and norms of international law in the full 
respect of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs . . .’
28  Although it is provided, under the Federal Law No. 99-FZ, ‘the duty for all states to respect the general 
principles and norms of international law in the full respect of the principle of non-interference in 
internal affairs’ (Art. 5(2)).
29  As amended by the Federal Law No. 179-FZ of July 23, 2010 [Федеральный закон от 23 июля 
2010 г. № 179-ФЗ «О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон «О государственной политике 
Российской Федерации в отношении соотечественников за рубежом»» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 
23 iyulya 2010 g. No. 179-FZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi zakon “O gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov za rubezhom”’]].
30  Patrick daillier et al., droit international public ¶ 240 (8e éd., LgdJ 2009).
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put into context. however, such a statute is never neutral as, on the one hand, it 
could have triggered a dispute31 and, on the other hand, because russia’s support for 
her compatriots was accompanied by a financial package. the russian Federation’s 
financial support for initiatives launched by her ‘compatriots’ had already been 
hinted at when the Federal Law No. 99-FZ was adopted. Provision had been made, 
in particular, for support to be given for the protection of their fundamental rights32 
and ‘in the economic and social sphere.’33 Moreover, humanitarian aid in the event of 
‘exceptional circumstances,’34 specific assistance for ‘socially vulnerable categories’ or 
even incentives for commercial co-operation through the creation, for instance, of 
joint commercial ventures.35 Concrete financial assistance nevertheless took time to 
achieve a degree of effectiveness. It took the Presidential decree No. 678 of May 25, 
2011, to institute a ‘fund for the support and protection of the rights of compatriots 
living overseas.’  this scheme, which was mysteriously financed,36 entered its operational 
phase on January 1, 2012; its aim is to support groups protecting russian compatriots 
by providing, for example, legal advice or other assistance connected to the protection 
of the russian language37 or in educational matters.38 the implementation of such 
a structure is indeed a sign that the kremlin now has the means to fulfil its aims and 
wishes make the protection of its ‘compatriots’ a weapon of foreign policy. Purely from 
a strategic point of view, it would be wrong not to do so.
this unilateral activism has been extended in part extended by conventions. 
russia concluded a series of agreements intended to settle the issue of the status of 
its nationals living overseas. specific agreements were thus concluded with Belarus39 
31  on the legal characterisation of the triggering of a dispute, cf. Carlo santulli, droit du contentieux 
international 203 f. (Montchrestien 2005).
32  It is Art. 15 ‘support for Compatriots in the Field of the Fundamental rights and Freedoms of Man 
and the Citizen.’
33  this is Art. 16.
34  these ‘exceptional circumstances’ should be understood as a reference to natural or human disasters 
and not as the notion of ‘exceptional circumstances’ that is so well known, particularly in French 
law.
35  this is Art. 16(1).
36  the decree provides that the fund is supplemented, quite obviously, firstly by the federal budget but 
also, more surprisingly, by gifts and bequests.
37  In this respect, the Baltic states are the subject of particular attention which appears quite clearly 
on the fund’s website <http://www.pravfond.ru/>. the creation of the website is itself a sign of the 
importance that russia now attaches to this policy.
38  Cf.,e.g., the willingness to participate in the ‘young Leaders’ school’ in Moscow and to recruit 60 
students in former soviet states (<http://pravfond.ru/?module=news&action=view&id=815>).
39  Cf., e.g., the treaty on friendship, good neighbourliness and co-operation of February 21, 1995 [Договор 
о дружбе, добрососедстве и сотрудничестве между Российской Федерацией и Республикой 
Беларусь от 21 февраля 1995 г. [Dogovor o druzhbe, dobrososedstve i sotrudnichestve mezhdu Rossiiskoi 
Federatsiei i Respublikoi Belarus’ ot 21 fevralya 1995 g.]], or even the treaty of december 25, 1998, ‘on 
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and ukraine,40 and posit the principles of national treatment, non-discrimination 
and the protection of minorities. while these agreements naturally could not 
enshrine the concept of ‘compatriot’ (which would not be readily accepted by third 
parties), they do give concrete expression in Belarusian and ukrainian law of russia’s 
intention to protect her nationals. the use of conventions is, moreover, a special 
and indispensable instrument for matters relating to the status of russian troops 
on ukrainian and Belarusian territory.
2.2. Preserving the Military Legacy
Following the collapse of the soviet union, one of the major issues for russia 
was how to maintain her military bases in those countries that had become third-
party states, and particularly in Belarus and ukraine. For the latter, the russian base 
at sebastopol drew particular attention. Admittedly, the return of the Crimea to the 
russian Federation means that the legal issues surrounding the sebastopol base 
no longer reflect positive law. those issues are no less interesting, not only from 
a historical but also from a scientific point of view for the purpose of this article. 
russian soldiers based at sebastopol benefited from a number of guarantees provided 
under the Agreement of May 28, 1997,41 initially concluded for a 20-year term42 and 
then extended for another 25 years, as of May 28, 2017, by a further agreement of 
April 21, 2010.43 the initial 1997 Agreement contained clauses establishing criminal 
jurisdiction rules in the event of criminal offences committed by russian soldiers on 
ukrainian soil. It provided under Art. 19(1) that, in principle, in the event of a crime 
committed by a russian soldier or by a member of his family, the ukrainian courts 
had jurisdiction to try the case. however, Art. 19(2) added a series of exceptions to 
the Equal rights of Citizens’ [Договор от 25 декабря 1998 г. «О равных правах граждан» [Dogovor 
ot 25 dekabrya 1998 ‘O ravnykh pravakh grazhdan’]] (specifically Art. 17 f.), which is itself based on the 
treaty on the union of Belarus and russia [Договор о союзе Беларуси и России [Dogovor o soyuze 
Belarusi i Rossii]], the effects of which are still virtual. Equally, cf. the treaty of April 28, 1998, ‘on the 
Legal status of Citizens of a state residing Continuously within the territory of Another state’ [Договор 
от 28 апреля 1998 г. «О правовом статусе граждан одного государства, постоянно проживающих 
на территории другого государства» [Dogovor ot 28 aprelya 1998 g. ‘O pravovom statuse grazhdan 
odnogo gosudarstva, postoyanno prozhivayushchikh na territorii drugogo gosudarstva’]] concluded 
within the framework of the CIs.
40  Cf. the treaty of May 21, 1997, ‘on Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership’ [Договор от 31 мая 1997 г. 
«o дружбе, сотрудничестве и партнерстве» [Dogovor ot 31 maya 1997 g. ‘O druzhbe, sotrudnichestve 
i partnerstve’]] (specifically Art. 10 f.).
41  this is the Agreement between the russian Federation and ukraine on the status and living conditions 
of the russian Federation’s Black sea fleet in ukrainian territory [Соглашение между Российской 
Федерацией и Украиной о статусе и условиях пребывания Черноморского флота Российской 
Федерации на территории Украины [Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Ukrainoi o statuse 
i usloviyakh prebyvaniya Chernomorskogo flota Rossiiskoi Federatsii na territorii Ukrainy]].
42  Article 25.
43  It provides for rent of us $ 100 million as well as a preferential rate on gas (Art. 2 of the Agreement 
of April 21, 2010).
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the automatic exercise of ukrainian jurisdiction, featuring (fairly typically) those 
crimes directly committed by russian soldiers in deployment zones or crimes 
against the russian state. In an equally classic sense, the Agreement also provided 
that, in cases where russia wishes to exercise jurisdiction, she could proceed with 
a repatriation request, it being understood that the ukrainian authorities were to 
make decisions ‘humanely and without delay.’44 Conversely, and more unusually, 
the scope of application of russia’s active criminal jurisdiction related not only 
to acts committed by members of the military per se, but also ‘members of their 
families.’ If we refer to Art. 2(5) of the same Agreement, these are defined, broadly 
speaking, as ‘the partners, children, other next of kin living continuously with them, 
or their dependents.’ the scope of application rationae personae therefore proved, 
in fine, to be particularly broad as it was not limited to soldiers in active service or 
located on the sebastopol base, but rather concerned an indeterminate number 
of persons. All in all, the scope of application of the treaty fluctuated in relation to 
decisions, not of the contracting parties, but rather those arising from the personal 
relationships that russian soldiers had with more or less distant relatives. It was 
therefore not impossible that where, by chance, the great aunt of a russian soldier 
in sebastopol (with whom she lived) had murdered a person in kiev, russia would 
submit a repatriation request to the ukrainian authorities and that the latter should 
give a decision ‘humanely and without delay.’ For the sake of comparison, it will be 
noted that the treaties on the status of French soldiers stationed in a third-party state 
would not benefit from such a broad scope of application rationae personae.45
the Agreement concluded with Belarus on January 6, 1995, on the status of 
russian military personnel on Belarusian soil is palpably similar.46 the notion of 
44  Article 19(3).
45  Cf. Art. 13 of the Agreement concluded with Morocco on the status of forces of May 16, 2005 [décret 
n° 2009-428 du 16 avril 2009 portant publication de l’accord entre le gouvernement de la république 
française et le gouvernement du royaume du Maroc relatif au statut de leurs forces, signé à rabat le 
16 mai 2005] (decree No. 2009-428 of April 16, 2009, J.o., April 19, 2009, p. 6748); Art. 16 of the treaty 
on co-operation in defence matters concluded with djibouti of december 21, 2011 (ratification bill 
No. 425 of November 21, 2012, put before the National Assembly); Art. 15 of the treaty on partnership 
in defence matters concluded with the Ivory Coast of January 26, 2012 (ratification bill No. 426 of 
November 21, 2012, put before the National Assembly).
the notion of dependent is generally defined as ‘the partner or any other person living in a conjugal 
relationship, in accordance with the legislation of the host state, with a member of staff, together with 
their underage children’ (cf. the Agreement with Cameroon instituting a defence partnership of May 21, 
2009 [décret n° 2012-989 du 23 août 2012 portant publication de l’accord entre le gouvernement de 
la république française et le gouvernement de la république du Cameroun instituant un partenariat 
de défense (ensemble une annexe), signé à yaoundé le 21 mai 2009] (decree No. 2012-989 of August 
23, 2012, J.o., August 25, 2012, p. 13800)).
46  this is, more exactly, the Agreement between the russian Federation and the republic of Belarus on 
issues of jurisdiction and mutual judicial co-operation in relation to the temporary residence of military 
formations of strategic forces of the russian Federation on the territory of the republic of Belarus 
of November 27, 1995 [Соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Беларусь 
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‘family member’ is almost identical, except that it excludes those individuals who 
hold Belarusian nationality. Conversely, the extent of russian jurisdiction in criminal 
matters was circumscribed with a little more precision. russian criminal jurisdiction 
shall only apply to offences committed by members of a russian soldier’s family where 
such individuals are ‘in the deployment zones of . . . [military] formations.’47 All in all, in 
the Agreement concluded with Belarus, the scope of application rationae personae 
is limited by a stricter framework from a rationae loci point of view. Consequently, 
it would appear that the extension of jurisdiction permitted under the terms of 
the Agreement remains more favourable to russia in the case of ukraine than with 
Belarus. the latter therefore succeeded, in part, to contain the extraterritorial reach 
of russian jurisdiction in criminal matters.
russia’s interests, i.e. russian presence in Belarus and ukraine inherited from the 
soviet union, have thus been protected in part thanks to the extraterritorial scope 
of russian or international norms relative thereto. this aspect of those norms is, 
in principle, little more than one of the most common legal techniques. we must 
therefore consider that russian normative influence in this particular field remains 
marginal as russia has contented herself with extending a factual situation brought 
about by the collapse of the soviet union. In that sense, it is only the minimum 
degree of her normative influence. this is likely the reason why russia quickly 
adopted another, more effective, technique, whereby russia becomes the instigator 
of normative convergence through the promotion of normative alignment.
3. The Promotion of Normative Convergence
the phenomenon of normative convergence, which is especially clear and 
often studied within the European union, is not the preserve of western Europe. It 
is a global phenomenon that affects russia, which also plays an active part therein. 
Experience tells us that this movement is all the more dynamic in that it takes place 
within an international organization or, at the very least, within institutionalized 
relationships. thus Europe – especially over the course of the 1990s but less so 
now, in reality – played a significant role in promoting this convergence, which 
has greatly permeated some laws in russia, Belarus and ukraine.48 From a slightly 
о сотрудничестве и взаимодействии в обеспечении безопасности воинских формирований 
Российской Федерации, временно размещенных на территории Республики Беларусь, и лиц, 
входящих в их состав, от 27 ноября 1995 г. [Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi 
Belarus’ o sotrudnichestve i vzaimodeistvii v obespechenii bezopasnosti voinskikh formirovanii Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii, vremenno razmeshchennykh na territorii Respubliki Belarus’, i lits, vkhodyashchikh v ikh sostav, 
ot 27 noyabrya 1995 g.]].
47  Article 5(1) of the Agreement.
48  this is the case, for example, for laws, the titles of which are absolutely identical – ‘on the Freedom of 
Conscience and religious organisations:’ in ukraine (Law of ukraine No. 987-XII of April 23, 1991 [Закон 
України от 23 апреля 1991 г. № 987-XII «Про свободу совісті та релігійні організації» [Zakon Ukrayiny 
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different standpoint, the CIs has also served as an institutionalised framework for 
the concertation and promotion of normative convergence (sec. 3.1). Except that the 
CIs has not been the setting for mutual and egalitarian / equal convergence where 
each state would be an active participant on the same footing as the others. russia 
has also played a key role in this convergence, so much so that the convergence is 
tantamount to an alignment, where the CIs is in reality nothing more than a lever 
of influence for russia in ensuring the projection of her law to other CIs Member 
states (sec. 3.2).
3.1. The CIS – a Framework for Convergence
In addition to the fact that it allowed the relatively peaceful secession of the 
former republics, the CIs was instituted for the purposes of constructing normative 
convergence. Founded on (initially) common principles, its objectives are varied and 
aim, particularly through the conclusion of international agreements, to develop 
co-operation in fields such as the economy, education, health, the environment,49 
and security.50 In addition, there is a duty to co-operate and co-ordinate amongst 
the states Parties, for instance in immigration, customs duties and organised crime.51 
this drive towards integration was favoured by the highly progressive52 creation of 
vid 23 kvitnya 1991 r. No. 987-XII ‘Pro svobodu sovіstі ta relіgіinі organіzatsіyi’]]); Belarus (Law of the republic 
of Belarus No. 2054-XІІ of december 17, 1992) [Закон Республики Беларусь от 17 декабря 1992 г. 
№ 2054-XII «О свободе совести и религиозных организациях» [Zakon Respubliki Belarus’ ot 17 dekabrya 
1992 g. No. 2054-XII ‘O svobode sovesti i religioznykh organizatsiyakh’]]); russia (Federal Law No. 125-FZ of 
september 26, 1997 [Федеральный закон от 26 сентября 1997 г. № 125-ФЗ «О свободе совести и о 
религиозных объединениях» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 26 sentyabrya 1997 g. No. 125-FZ ‘O svobode sovesti 
i o religioznykh ob’edineniyakh’]]). once again, we can see that the russian legislative process was slower 
which is essentially due to the political instability of the 1990s. For a more detailed study of this law, 
cf. olga gille-Belova, La situation des minorités religieuses dans la Russie contemporaine, in L’Europe des 
religions (hugo Flavier & Jean-Pierre Moisset, éds.) 121 f. (Pedone 2013).
this is also the case for laws on the protection of national minorities: in ukraine (Law No. 2494-ХII of June 25, 
1992 [Закон Украины от 5 июня 1992 № 2494-XII «o национальных меньшинствах в Украине» [Zakon 
Ukrainy ot 5 iyunya 1992 g. No. 2494-XII ‘O natsional’nykh men’shinstvakh v Ukraine’]]); Belarus (Law of the 
republic of Belarus No. 1926-XII of November 11, 1992 [Закон Республики Беларусь от 11 ноября 
1992 г. № 1926-XII «О национальных меньшинствах в Республике Беларусь» [Zakon Respubliki Belarus’ 
ot 11 noyabrya 1992 g. No. 1926-XII ‘O natsional’nykh men’shinstvakh v Respublike Belarus’’]]); in russia 
where there is a broader Federal Law ‘on Cultural and National Autonomy’ (Federal Law No. 74-FZ of June 
17, 1996 [Федеральный закон от 17 июня 1996 г. № 74-ФЗ «О национально-культурной автономии» 
[Federal’nyi zakon ot 17 iyunya 1996 g. No. 74-FZ ‘O natsional’no-kul’turnoi avtonomii’]]).
49  Article 4 of the Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent states.
50  Article 6 of the Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent states. It will be noted 
that, surprisingly Art. 6 also provides that ‘[t]he Parties shall respect the wish of each to secure the 
status of nuclear-free zone and that of neutral state.’
51  Article 7 of the Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of Independent states.
52  while the issue of the status of CIs bodies has been established since 1993, in the Agreement titled 
‘Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent states’ of January 22, 1993 [Устав Содружества 
Независимых Государств от 22 января 1993 г. [Ustav Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv ot 22 
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shared institutions with powers to take unilateral action;53 so much so that, in 1998, 
the Economic Court of the CIs considered that it was a fully-fledged international 
organisation.54 Amidst the profusion of institutions and agreements resulting from 
the CIs, the Interparliamentary Assembly of states Parties to the CIs played an 
often forgotten part in the construction a common normative platform. this was 
formally established by the Agreement between the supreme soviets of the states 
Parties to the CIs on March 27, 1992. Composed of delegations from the respective 
parliamentary assemblies of the Member states, it is only a consultative body; 
surprisingly for an assembly, it decides ‘by consensus.’55 In particular, it is competent 
yanvarya 1993 g.]] [hereinafter CIs Charter], it took until october 9, 2009, for the decision-making 
process to be specified in the decision of the Council of heads of state of the CIs october 9, 2009, 
‘on Procedural rules of the Council of heads of state, the Council of heads of government, of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers and of the Economic Council of the Commonwealth of Independent 
states’ [Решение от 9 октября 2009 г. «o Правилах процедуры Совета глав государств, Совета 
глав правительств, Совета министров иностранных дел и Экономического совета Содружества 
Независимых Государств» [Reshenie ot 9 oktyabrya 2009 g. ‘O Pravilakh protsedury Soveta glav 
gosudarstv, Soveta glav pravitel’stv, Soveta ministrov inostrannykh del i Ekonomicheskogo soveta 
Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv’]] [hereinafter decision on Procedural rules].
53  More precisely, the Council of heads of state and the Council of heads of government decide by 
consensus. It is true, however, that the constructive abstentions technique was included (Art. 23 of 
the CIs Charter and Art. 7(5) of the decision on Procedural rules).
54  Cf. the Consultative opinion No. 01-1/2-98 of the Economic Court of the CIs of June 23, 1998, on 
the interpretation of the CIs Charter [Консультативное заключение Экономического Суда СНГ 
от 23 июня 1998 г. № 01-1/2-98 о толковании Устава Содружества Независимых Государств 
от 22 января 1993 г. [Konsul’tativnoe zaklyuchenie Ekonomicheskogo Suda SNG ot 23 iyunya 1998 g. 
No. 01-1/2-98 o tolkovanii Ustava Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv ot 22 yanvarya 1993 g.]] which 
concluded that, considering that the Commonwealth can establish relations with international 
organisations, it had already concluded treaties with other subjects of international law, that it had 
adopted unilateral acts ‘in its own right,’ that it has the option of imposing sanctions on its members, 
the CIs has international legal personality. this position was confirmed by the decision No. 01-1/1-
10 of February 15, 2010, on the clarification of the Consultative opinion No. 01-1/2-98 of January 
22, 1993 [Определение от 15 февраля 2010 г. № 01-1/1-10 о разъяснении Консультативного 
заключения Экономического Суда СНГ от 23 июня 1998 г. № 01-1/2-98 о толковании Устава 
Содружества Независимых Государств от 22 января 1993 г. [Opredelenie ot 15 fevralya 2010 g. 
o raz’yasnenii Konsul’tativnogo zaklyucheniya Ekonomicheskogo Suda SNG ot 23 iyunya 1998 g. No. 01-1/2-
98 o tolkovanii Ustava Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv ot 22 yanvarya 1993 g.]]. In the latter case, 
the Court reaches the logical conclusion that the CIs may be a party to a multilateral agreement.
55  Article 7 of the Agreement of March 27, 1992 [Соглашение от 27 марта 1992 «О Межпарламентской 
Ассамблее государств – участников Содружества Независимых Государств» [Soglashenie ot 
27 marta 1992 g. ‘O Mezhparlamentskoi Assamblee gosudarstv – uchastnikov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh 
Gosudarstv’]]. the decision-making process is surprising. It is, to our knowledge, the sole instance 
where a parliamentary body finds itself under a duty to decide by consensus. this voting system 
reveals a great deal about the true nature of the Interparliamentary Assembly, which is merely a para-
parliamentary extension of the intergovernmental bodies of the CIs. Indeed, consensus implies that 
the Assembly is not a forum for debate and not, therefore, the political arena understood as being 
a place of institutionalised confrontation (in this respect, cf. slobodan Milacic, de l’âge idéologique 
à l’âge politique. L’Europe postcommuniste vers la démocratie pluraliste (Bruylant 2010)). Furthermore, 
it is clear that voting by consensus is better adapted to international organisations composed of 
diplomatic representatives of Member states, not to interparliamentary assemblies. the sole, very 
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to discuss economic and social issues, promote parliamentary co-operation, but also 
to adopt recommendations establishing templates for laws or legal acts relative to 
issues ‘of common interest to all parties.’56
despite the lacunae inherent to the status held by that body and its more 
than limited powers, the Interparliamentary Assembly has done some interesting 
work which was formerly directed at maintaining a common judicial area but 
now contributes to the promotion of the normative community. this is how many 
model codes57 or model laws58 have been adopted, and we might think that these 
play a part, on their own level, in the construction of a common judicial area, and 
underline the originality of the convergence phenomenon. Convergence is indeed 
the result of a process made up of a multitude of national and international acts 
which lead towards a sort of normative unification. In this sense, convergence is to 
be found at the mid-point of a normative strategy: while the impetus behind the 
convergence may appear to be proactive, the effects induced retain a number of 
objective characteristics, especially where they are implemented in a multilateral 
framework of institutionalized co-operation which transcends the intentions of one 
single state. And it appears that the CIs has constitutes a lever of power for russia 
which has been extended on a normative level. this convergence, in the specific 
modest, exception in the CIs can be found in Art. 9(2) of the regulations on the permanent committees 
of the Interparliamentary Assembly [Постановление Межпарламентской Ассамблеи государств – 
участников Содружества Независимых Государств от 23 мая 1993 г. «Об утверждении положения 
о постоянных комиссиях Межпарламентской Ассамблеи» [Postanovlenie Mezhparlamentskoi 
Assamblei gosudarstv – uchastnikov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv ot 23 maya 1993 g. ‘Ob 
utverzhdenii polozheniya o postoyannykh komissiyakh Mezhparlamentskoi Assamblei’]], where it is 
stated that ‘[t]he decisions of the committees on procedural issues are adopted by simple majority 
of those participating in the meeting.’
56  Article 8.
57  Cf., e.g., the Model Civil Code (adopted in stages: the first part – on october 29, 1994; the second – on 
May 13, 1995; the third – on February 17, 1996; amended on June 16, 2003, in respect of intellectual 
property provisions), the Model Criminal Code (adopted on February 17, 1996), taxation Code 
(december 9, 2000), Code on Land use (adopted december 7, 2002), Information Code (the first 
part was adopted on November 23, 2012), etc.
58  the fields are varied. to illustrate, there are the model laws of November 2, 1996, on the fight against 
criminal organisations [Рекомендательный законодательный акт от 2 ноября 1996 г. «О борьбе 
с организованной преступностью» [Rekomendatel’nyi zakonodatel’nyi akt ot 2 noyabrya 1996 g. 
‘O bor’be s organizovannoi prestupnost'yu’]], and that, of the same date, on physical education and sport 
[Рекомендательный законодательный акт от 2 ноября 1996 г. «О физической культуре и спорте» 
[Rekomendatel’nyi zakonodatel'nyi akt ot 2 noyabrya 1996 g. ‘O fizicheskoi kul’ture i sporte’]]. there is 
also that of February 17, 1996, on joint stock companies [Рекомендательный законодательный акт 
от 17 февраля 1996 г. «Об акционерных обществах» [Rekomendatel’nyi zakonodatel’nyi akt ot 17 fevralya 
1996 g. ‘Ob aktsionernykh obshchestvakh’]]; that of the November 16, 2006, on the Prokuratura 
[Модельный закон от 16 ноября 2006 г. «o прокуратуре» [Model’nyi zakon ot 16 noyabrya 2006 g. 
‘O prokurature’]]; that of November 23, 2012, on rail transport [Модельный закон от 23 ноября 2012 г. 
«О железнодорожном транспорте» [Model’nyi zakon ot 23 noyabrya 2012 g. ‘O zheleznodorozhnom 
transporte’]] or even that, of the same date, business confidentiality [Модельный закон от 23 ноября 
2012 г. «o коммерческой тайне» [Model’nyi zakon ot 23 noyabrya 2012 g. ‘O kommercheskoi taine’]].
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framework of the CIs, has to be understood as a progressive alignment of Member 
states on russian law and not as the result of a series of concerted activities that 
themselves result, over a period of years, in a common normative platform.
3.2. The CIS – a Lever of Influence
whilst it is true that the CIs is a multilateral framework of co-operation and 
concertation, the balance of power bears the stamp of inequality. the CIs is not an 
organisation in which the political balance between Member states is the product 
of a scholarly weighting between the ‘big’ and the ‘small’ states as is the case with 
the European union. this economic and political imbalance, to russia’s advantage, 
runs through the CIs as a whole59 and had necessarily to materialise in legal form.
this is now russia has used the CIs as a stepping stone for her own norms towards 
Belarus and ukraine. such normative activism has been particularly significant in the 
context of the fight against terrorism. It is well known that russia has been greatly 
affected by terrorism and that the russian authorities’ response had been widely 
covered in the media. these attacks, essentially linked to the conflicts in the Caucasus 
and particularly to the wars in Chechnya – which the russian Constitutional Court 
has dubbed a ‘civil war’60 – had pushed russia to put in place a legislative arsenal, 
initially limited to her own territory and subsequently exported. the aim of this paper 
is not to examine the content or opportunity of this legislative activity, but to analyse 
the extent to which it may have constituted the impetus for reforms in ukraine and 
Belarus. russia’s Federal Law on the fight against terrorism was adopted on June 25, 
1998.61 It consists of eight chapters on the institutions competent to take part in 
that fight, the issues related to the damage caused by acts of terrorism and the 
social support to be offered to victims, etc. It is especially striking to see the extent 
to which the Belarusian Law of January 3, 2002, is similar.62 Not only is its structure 
identical word for word, but the very content of the provisions is a (certified?) copy 
of the russian Federal Law. the ukrainian Law, passed on March 20, 2003,63 bears 
only marginal differences, in its phrasing and organisation, to the russian ‘template.’ 
59  on the de jure imbalance within EurAsEC, cf. infra, sec. 4.1.
60  ruling No. 10-P of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation of July 31, 1995, on the 
constitutionality of various presidential decrees on the war in Chechnya [Постановление КС РФ 
от 31 июля 1995 г. № 10-П [Postanovlenie KS RF ot 31 iyulya 1995 g. No. 10-P]], ¶ 2.
61  Federal Law No. 130-FZ of June 25, 1998, ‘on the Fight against terrorism’ [Федеральный закон 
от 25 июля 1998 г. № 130-ФЗ «О борьбе с терроризмом» [Federal’nyi zakon ot 25 iyulya 1998 g. 
No. 130-FZ ‘O bor’be s terrorizmom’]].
62  Law of the republic of Belarus’ No. 77-Z of January 3, 2002, ‘on the Fight against terrorism’ [Закон 
Республики Беларусь от 3 января 2002 г. № 77-З «О борьбе с терроризмом» [Zakon Respubliki 
Belarus’ ot 3 yanvarya 2002 g. No. 77-Z ‘O bor’be s terrorizmom’]].
63  Law of ukraine No. 638-IV of March 20, 2003, ‘on the Fight against terrorism’ [Закон Украины 
от 20 марта 2003 г. № 638-IV «О борьбе с терроризмом» [Zakon Ukrainy ot 20 marta 2003 g. No. 638-IV 
‘O bor’be s terrorizmom’]].
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the only substantive difference between the three statutes is to be found in the 
definition of ‘terrorism.’ the russian Federal Law was adopted before the attacks of 
september 11 and did not benefit from the discussions held on an international, 
or at least a European level.64 It thus puts forward a criterion of intention, which is 
unusual to say the least, as an act of terrorism has been committed if the latter ‘is 
carried out with the intention of provoking a way or complicating international 
relations.’  this is, nonetheless, less obscure than ukraine’s criterion, whereby an 
act of terrorism targets activities ‘the purpose of which is to achieve a criminal aim;’ 
ultimately, Belarus Law appears, formally, to be the most precise.65
the influence of russian Federal Law is patent in the fight against terrorism. It 
did not come about directly, in an immediate relationship between legal systems, 
but via the CIs.66 russia has indeed called for the establishment of the Anti-terrorist 
Centre, formally created by the heads of state of the CIs on June 21, 2000,67 tasked 
to facilitate operational co-operation by organising joint exercises for instance, 
or even to promote scientific co-operation through financial contributions to the 
organisation of lectures or seminars.68 this will has brought with it a fresh impetus 
and was consolidated on december 8, 1998, by the adoption of the Model Law by the 
Interparliamentary Assembly,69 which contains, identical to the very last comma, the 
definition of acts of terrorism forged by the russian Federal Law and its unusual final 
criterion.70 It is therefore the bodies within the CIs and its Member states taken as 
64  Cf. the definition posited by the Council Common Position of 27 december 2001 on the application 
of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/CFsP), 2001 o.J. (L 344) 93.
65  this is, in particular, ‘an explosion, arson or other acts that endanger human life, causing bodily harm, 
large-scale damage or other serious consequences, with the aim of destabilising the social order or 
intimidating a section of the population or influence the decision-making process of public authorities.’ 
Numerous supplementary examples follow this provision.
66  Article 7 of the Agreement establishing the CIs stated from the outset that the common actions of 
the high Contracting Parties include ‘the fight against criminal organisations.’
67  decision of June 21, 2000, ‘on the Establishment of an Anti-terrorist Centre of the states Parties 
of the Commonwealth of Independent states’ [Решение Совета глав государств Содружества 
Независимых Государств от 21 июня 2000 г. «О создании Антитеррористического центра 
государств – участников Содружества Независимых Государств» [Reshenie Soveta glav gosudarstv 
Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv ot 21 iyunya 2000 g. ‘O sozdanii Antiterroristicheskogo tsentra 
gosudarstv – uchastnikov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv’]]. this was a political decision 
followed by the further decision of the Council of heads of state of december 1, 2000 [Решение 
от 1 декабря 2000 г. «oб Антитеррористическом центре государств – участников Содружества 
Независимых Государств» [reshenie ot 1 dekabrya 2000 g. ‘ob Antiterroristicheskom tsentre 
gosudarstv – uchastnikov sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh gosudarstv’]], then by regulations, of the 
same date, which establish the centre’s status main operational rules.
68  regulations, supra n. 67, Art. 2.12.
69  Model Law of december 8, 1998, ‘on the Fight against terrorism’ [Модельный закон от 8 декабря 
1998 г. «o борьбе с терроризмом» [Model’nyi zakon ot 8 dekabrya 1998 g. ‘O bor’be s terrorizmom’]].
70  Id. Art. 4. It will be noted, however, that the new Model Law adopted by the Interparliamentary 
Assembly on April 17, 2004 (amendment resulting from decree No. 23-5) [Модельный закон «О борьбе 
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a whole that have contributed to the emergence of a full legislative arsenal by following 
the path initially taken by russia. this systematic adoption of russian provisions does 
indeed show that russian law wields its own influence. In this particular case, it did 
not resort to the extraterritoriality technique but set about publicising that influence 
through the CIs, the latter becoming a level of power. In practice, this ‘multiplier effect’ 
that russia intends the CIs to have is reflected in positive law.
the phenomenon of normative convergence, studied in a relational framework 
with russia on one side and ukraine and Belarus on the other, is doubly curious. 
on the one hand, it is a convergence which is in keeping with an alignment with 
russian law. on the other hand, this is not done directly but through the CIs. this 
international organisation thus becomes, even on a legal level, an institution 
disseminating russian normative influence throughout post-soviet states. In that 
respect, we cannot formally speak of russian unilateralism. however, it seems that in 
recent times russia has not hesitated in employing a number of unilateral practices 
in order to force her partners to align themselves with her legislation. this is another 
technique used by russia, over and above the other two, which supplements the 
legal arsenal intended to promote her legal influence. 
4. The Boost to Normative Expansion
Normative influence techniques are not static. they are in a state of constant 
evolution and have had to adapt to new legal instruments, new political and legal 
contexts created by states as players in international legal transactions. russia has, 
in particular, relied upon her advantageous institutional position within EurAsEC to 
promote her law and her own choices by imposing them, unilaterally, on ukraine and 
Belarus. By institutionalising the political and economic imbalance of its members, 
EurAsEC has allowed russia to use that organisation as a catalyst for her power 
(sec. 4.1). EurAsEC is thus gradually becoming an organisation that allows russia 
to expand her legal influence within that organisation, but also to transform it into 
a stepping stone for her power and to impose certain choices, beyond EurAsEC and 
in breach of the rules, on non-Member states (sec. 4.2).
4.1. The Expression of Power within EurAsEC
russia has long sought to create a framework for institutionalised co-operation with 
newly independent states. Faced with their reluctance – some, like the Baltic states, 
clearly opting for Europe – it has been difficult for russia to achieve tangible results. 
this explains the proliferation of agreements concluded with CIs states, the purpose of 
с терроризмом» (новая редакция) (принят Постановлением Межпарламентской Ассамблеи 
государств – участников СНГ от 17 апреля 2004 г. № 23-5) [Model’nyi zakon ‘O bor’be s terrorizmom’ 
(novaya redaktsiya) (prinyat Postanovleniem Mezhparlamentskoi Assamblei gosudarstv – uchastnikov 
SNG ot 17 aprelya 2004 g. No. 23-5)]], does not adopt the same final criterion.
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which was to intensify relations in the context of regional alliances. without claiming to 
be exhaustive, we may mention, aside from the specific case of the Collective security 
treaty organisation,71 the treaty on the creation of the union state between Belarus 
and russia of december 8, 1999,72 which followed on the heels of the treaty of February 
26, 1999, on the Customs union and the single Economic space.73 the latter treaty went 
on to become, on october 10, 2000, EurAsEC, which would have a more glorious future. 
Indeed, it was the setting for the creation, in the long run, of the Customs union with 
Belarus, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan and tajikistan. For russia, EurAsEC has been a way 
of ensuring the effectiveness of the regional alliances that she has brought about 
or encouraged. the results are tangible, numerous and come one after the other at 
a frenetic pace, thus demonstrating that the integrative approach of cultivated spill-
over74 has retained its virtues. the Customs union, the treaty concluded in through 
EurAsEC on october 6, 2007,75 came into effect on July 1, 2011: there are no internal 
71  this organisation, based on the Collective security treaty signed on May 15, 1992 [Договор от 15 мая 
1992 г. «o коллективной безопасности» [Dogovor ot 15 maya 1992 g. ‘O kollektivnoi bezopasnosti’]], 
was established by two treaties dated october 7, 2002: one concerning the statutes of the Collective 
security treaty organisation [Устав Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности 
[Ustav Organizatsii Dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti]], the other on the legal status of the 
Collective security treaty organisation [Соглашение о правовом статусе Организации Договора 
о коллективной безопасности [Soglashenie o pravovom statuse Organizatsii Dogovora o kollektivnoi 
bezopasnosti]].
72  Many agreements have been concluded on this subject and not a single one has yielded concrete 
results. this is the case for the treaty on the creation of the russia-Belarus Community of April 2, 
1996 [Договор об образовании Сообщества России и Беларуси от 2 апреля 1996 г. [Dogovor 
ob obrazovanii Soobshchestva Rossii i Belarusi ot 2 aprelya 1996 g.]], and the treaty on the Belarus-
russia union of April 2, 1997 [Договор о Союзе Беларуси и России от 2 апреля 1997 г. [Dogovor 
o Soyuze Belarusi i Rossii ot 2 aprelya 1997 g.]]. Following the declaration on the further unification 
of russia and Belarus on december 25, 1998 [Декларация о дальнейшем единении Беларуси 
и России от 25 декабря 1998 г. [Deklaratsiya o dal’neishem edinenii Belarusi i Rossii ot 25 dekabrya 
1998 g.]], the treaty establishing state union was concluded on december 8, 1999 [Договор от 8 де- 
кабря 1999 г. «О создании Союзного государства» [Dogovor ot 8 dekabrya 1999 g. ‘O sozdanii 
Soyuznogo gosudarstva’]]. the proliferation of treaties on the same or similar aims was already the 
sign of a lack of effectiveness . . . For an overview of these agreements and a geopolitical analysis, 
cf. teurtrie, supra n. 2.
73  this treaty, signed by russia, Belarus, kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan and tajikistan, is itself an extension of 
the treaty of April 30, 1994, establishing the single Economic space between kazakhstan, kyrgyzstan 
and uzbekistan [Договор от 30 апреля 1994 г. «o создании Единого экономического пространства 
между Республикой Казахстан, Кыргызской Республикой и Республикой Узбекистан» [Dogovor ot 
30 aprelya 1994 g. ‘O sozdanii Edinogo ekonomicheskogo prostranstva mezhdu Respublikoi Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzskoi Respublikoi i Respublikoi Uzbekistan’]], and of the Agreement on Customs union between 
russia and Belarus of January 6, 1995 [Соглашение от 6 января 1995 г. «o Таможенном союзе 
между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Беларусь» [Soglashenie ot 6 yanvarya 1995 g. 
‘O Tamozhennom soyuze mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Belarus’’]].
74  Panayotis soldatos, Le système institutionnel et politique des Communautés européennes dans un 
monde en mutation: théorie et pratique 138 (Bruylant 1989).
75  this is the treaty establishing the single Customs Area and instituting the Customs union of october 6, 
2007, concluded between Belarus, russia and kazakhstan [Договор от 6 октября 2007 г. «o создании 
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customs frontiers for goods between Belarus, kazakhstan and russia. on November 18, 
2011, the Member states of the Customs union set up a Commission,76 the operation 
of which is fundamentally different to that of the European Commission,77 and whose 
missions consist in guaranteeing the proper functioning of the Customs union, be it 
in terms of customs duties, competition, energy policy, etc., as well as ensuring that 
the treaties and agreements of the Customs union and the single Economic space 
are respected.78 on the same day, the declaration on Eurasian economic integration 
announced the creation of the single Economic space in which the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and persons would be guaranteed and which may result 
a real Eurasian Economic union in 2015.
Finally, to complete this (Impressionist) picture of intra-CIs conventional 
relationships, it will be noted that ukraine refused to be a party to all aspects of this 
integration process. Either hesitant or cautious, she wished to manage her European 
partners whilst only associating herself with the agreements concluded through 
EurAsEC one at a time. In the face of this, Moscow opted for a ‘bait strategy’ towards 
her reluctant neighbours. she offered to conclude the treaty on the Free trade Zone 
(FtZ) which seeks to unite the states that have not joined the Customs union, amongst 
which number ukraine seems to be essential. the treaty establishing the FtZ was 
signed by many CIs Member states on october 18, 2011. ratified by russia, Belarus 
and ukraine, it came into force on september 20, 2012.79 russia is thus weaving a web 
of conventional networks, which take the form of concentric circles.
единой таможенной территории и формировании Таможенного союза» [Dogovor ot 6 oktyabrya 
2007 g. ‘O sozdanii edinoi tamozhennoi territorii i formirovanii Tamozhennogo soyuza’]], as well as the treaty 
on the Customs union Commission of october 6, 2007 [Договор от 6 октября 2007 г. «o Комиссии 
Таможенного союза» [Dogovor ot 6 oktyabrya 2007 g. ‘O Komissii Tamozhennogo soyuza’]].
76  this was created by the treaty of November 18, 2011, on the Eurasian Economic Commission [Договор 
от 18 ноября 2011 г. «О Евразийской экономической комиссии» [Dogovor ot 18 noyabrya 2011 g. 
‘O Evraziiskoi ekonomicheskoi komissii’]], the practical operation of which us governed by the working 
regulations of the Eurasian Economic Commission adopted by decision No. 1 of the EurAsEC Interstate 
Council on the same date [Решение от 18 ноября 2011 г. № 1 «О Регламенте работы Евразийской 
экономической комиссии» [Reshenie ot 18 noyabrya 2011 No. 1 ‘O Reglamente raboty Evraziiskoi 
ekonomicheskoi komissii’]]. 
77  this Commission is in no way a supranational body. In reality, it is itself divided into two bodies: the 
Council of the Commission and the College of the Commission. under Art. 12 of the treaty on the 
Eurasian Economic Commission, the Council of the Commission ‘adopts decisions by consensus’ 
and, where this requirement is not satisfied, one of its members may appeal to the Eurasian higher 
Economic Council which is a meeting of the Council involving the heads of state and heads of 
government. the College of the Commission, which is the true executive body of the EurAsEC Customs 
union, adopts decisions and recommendations by consensus or a two-thirds qualified majority, and 
each state has three representatives.
78  Article 3 of the treaty.
79  Cf. treaty on the Free trade Zone of october 18, 2011 [Договор от 18 октября 2011 «o зоне 
свободной торговли» [Dogovor ot 18 oktyabrya 2011 g. ‘O zone svobodnoi torgovli’]], Art. 22 (on the 
formalities for the entry into force of the treaty).
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In these new regional economic relationships, russia has restructured her power 
by compelling her partners to accept that she ought, institutionally, to have carry more 
weight than them. the time when the decisions of the CIs were made purely through 
the adoption of an international agreement and when, by definition, each state 
formally retained a power of veto, has passed. step by step, the majority approach has 
taken its course and this is quite obvious in EurAsEC. Firstly, the operation of EurAsEC 
institutions is based on a double approach, a striking intergovernmental approach in 
which the decision-making process requires unanimity.80 this is the case, in particular, 
within the EurAsEC Interstate Council, which is ‘the highest body of the Customs 
union’81 and where the ordinary rules of procedure require consensus, except for 
decisions on the exclusion of a Member state.82 such pure intergovernmentalism is 
made up for by voting rules that follow a majority approach within the Integration 
Committee, in a sense that is eminently favourable to russia, given that she has 40% 
of the votes83 and decisions require a two-thirds majority; this, in practice, means that 
russia still have to obtain the support of at least two other Member states. In other 
words, the voting conditions for the Integration Committee allow russia to make it 
endorse decisions and constitute a crucible for her normative expansion.84
secondly, on June 9, 2009, following the disastrous consequences of the financial 
crisis in 2008, the EurAsEC Member states set up the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund.85 this 
Fund is almost entirely financed by russia, which secured 88% of the voting of the 
fund’s Council Committee.86 As a decision can only be made once a quorum of 90% 
80  with the constructive abstention mechanism.
81  treaty on the foundation of the Eurasian Economic union of october 10, 2000 [Договор об 
учреждении Евразийского экономического сообщества от 10 октября 2000 г. [Dogovor ob 
uchrezhdenii Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva]] [hereinafter EurAsEC treaty], Art. 5.
82  these decisions have to be made unanimously, not counting the vote of the state concerned (EurAsEC 
treaty, Art. 13(1)).
83  For the rest, Belarus and kazakhstan account for 15 votes, while kyrgyzstan and tajikistan account 
for 7.5 votes. uzbekistan had 15 votes prior to its withdrawal in 2008.
84  this imbalance is logical as the political and economic difference is obvious. we may even go so far as 
to say that, had the number of votes been strictly proportional to the real weight of Member states, 
russia could have claimed to hold a majority all by herself. this balance of votes must therefore be 
understood as a concession on russia’s part. the fact remains, however, that she is in a more favourable 
position than in the CIs, where it was necessary almost systematically to conclude a treaty subject to 
approval by each national legal system.
85  the Fund is based on the treaty signed on June 9, 2009, between russia, Belarus, kazakhstan, 
kyrgyzstan, tajikistan and Armenia establishing the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund [Договор от 9 июня 
2009 г. об учреждении Антикризисного фонда Евразийского экономического сообщества 
[Dogovor ot iyunya 2009 ob uchrezhdenii Antikrizisnogo fonda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo 
soobshchestva]] (with additional regulations on the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund), and on the Agreement 
on the management of the Anti-Crisis Fund adopted on the same date [Соглашение об управлении 
средствами Антикризисного фонда Евразийского экономического сообщества [Soglashenie ob 
upravlenii sredstvami Antikrizisnogo fonda Evraziiskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva]].
86  russia finances the Fund to the tune of us $ 7.5 billion out of the approximately us $ 8.5 billion (cf. 
treaty establishing the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund, Art. 3, and regulations on the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis 
Fund, Art. 14(4)).
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of the votes is obtained, it should not be very difficult for russia to decide the policy 
of this new body almost single-handedly. Conversely, nothing can be done without 
her, and it may even be said that russia has a blocking majority. It will be noted, 
incidentally, that it is quite possible that the fund will grant loans subject to a number 
of reform conditions. Consequently, russia is operating a policy of conditionality, 
even though she has traditionally rejected the same, citing the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs.87
thirdly and finally, the methods for resolving disputes within EurAsEC is also 
favourable to russia. the basic principle is that of seeking a diplomatic solution to 
disputes, for which russia has always had a natural inclination. Consequently, in the 
event of gross violations of EurAsEC rules by russia, such behaviour could nevertheless 
be approved ex post following a diplomatic arrangement. A measure initially contrary 
to EurAsEC law could therefore be accepted or imposed on russia’s fellow contracting 
parties, without the matter coming before the EurAsEC Court.88 the flexibility of the 
EurAsEC dispute resolution mechanism will therefore undoubtedly allow russia to 
impose some of her norms on her partners via the diplomatic route.
EurAsEC is therefore a catalyst for russian power which is likely, in future, to use 
all of its potential to the great benefit of her strategy of legal influence. despite an 
institutional framework that could not be more favourable, russia has not hesitated 
in recent times deliberately to break the most fundamental rules in order to impose 
new ones, beyond EurAsEC, on ukraine and Belarus.
4.2. The Expression of Power beyond EurAsEC
Very recently – and, therefore, very shortly after the Customs union and the FtZ 
came into force – russia has made decisions that directly disregard those undertakings. 
russia has therefore positioned herself in some sense beyond EurAsEC by exceeding 
her own rules and those of the integration zone that she shares with ukraine. It is 
no longer a matter of mere normative alignment, i.e. a fundamentally legal russian 
act that would induce neighbouring states to adopt the normative provision, but 
an illegal act which has attempted to force ukraine and Belarus to amend their own 
legislation in the area in question. In this respect, the case concerning the recycling 
tax on vehicles caused uproar. the tax, brought in by Federal Law on July 28, 
87  Admittedly, this conditionality is closer to that of the IMF than that of the Eu. the fact remains that it 
is a first step towards the development of a policy of conditionality, which has been roundly criticised. 
the enlargement of the customs union to include kyrgyzstan and the adoption of a detailed road 
map raise the same issues.
88  only state and institutional applications may be brought before the Court. on the Court’s jurisdiction, 
cf., essentially, EurAsEC treaty, Art. 8. Equally, reference can be made to the following instruments on 
the Customs union: treaty establishing the single Customs Area and instituting the Customs union, 
Art. 6; treaty on the Customs union Commission, Art. 16; Agreement on integrated customs tariff 
regulation, Art. 9; treaty on the Eurasian Economic Commission, Art. 18.
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2012,89 amends Art. 51(1) of the Budgetary Code of the russian Federation. Its ultimate 
purpose us to guarantee russia’s ‘environmental safety’90 by imposing a new tax on 
vehicles imported into russia, which mainly affects used cars. A number of russian 
car manufacturers91 were excluded from the scope of the new tax, as well as vehicles 
manufactured in a Member state of the Customs union.92 this does not, for all that, 
guarantee their full and complete compliance. Indeed, the exclusion only operates in 
respect of vehicles ‘that have the status of Customs union goods.’93 In other words, and 
in accordance with the Customs union statutes, only vehicles that have undergone 
significant changes in Belarus, for instance, are exempted. Consequently, all imported 
products, including those transiting through Belarus, are subject to the tax and nearly 
all of the automobile fleet, as the vehicles are already finished products; the same 
applies to those transiting through russia en route to Belarus.
It is not difficult to understand just how poorly this tax, which can prove to be very 
high (up to several thousand Euros), was viewed by the people and the governments 
of Belarus and ukraine. their reaction was now identical, however. ukraine, the 
more turbulent neighbour, vociferously protested and the bill was put forward on 
November 19, 2012, seeking to impose a ‘recycling tax’ on vehicles imported from 
russia.94 this draft piece of so-called mirror legislation, which was intended to come 
into force on January 1, 2013, is a genuine counter-measure within the meaning 
89  Federal Law No. 128-FZ of July 28, 2012, ‘on the Amendment to the Federal Law “on the Production and 
Consumption wastes” and Article 51 of the Budgetary Code of the russian Federation’ [Федеральный 
закон от 28 июля 2012 № 128-ФЗ «О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон «Об отходах 
производства и потребления» и статью 51 Бюджетного кодекса Российской Федерации» 
[Federal’nyi zakon ot 28 iyulya 2012 No. 128-FZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi zakon “Ob otkhodakh 
proizvodstva i potrebleniya” i stat’yu 51 Byudzhetnogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii’]] [hereinafter Federal 
Law No. 128-FZ].
90  Federal Law No. 89-FZ June 24, 1998, ‘on the Production and Consumption wastes’ [Федеральный 
закон от 24 июня 1998 г. № 89-ФЗ «Об отходах производства и потребления» [Federal’nyi zakon 
ot 24 iyunya 1998 g. No. 89-FZ ‘Ob otkhodakh proizvodstva i potrebleniya’]], Art. 24.1(1) (as amended 
by the Federal Law No. 128-FZ).
91  For instance, Avtovaz, Kamaz or Gaz, where these gave environmental ‘guarantees’ and undertook to 
set up a waste recycling and treatment loop.
92  Cf. Federal Law ‘on the Production and Consumption wastes,’ Art. 24.1(6) (as amended by the Federal 
Law No. 128-FZ). Equally, reference may be made to the government decree No. 870 of August 30, 
2012, ‘on the recycling tax Concerning road Vehicles’ [Постановление Правительства РФ от 30 ав- 
густа 2012 г. № 870 «Об утилизационном сборе в отношении колесных транспортных средств» 
[Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva RF ot 30 avgusta 2012 g. No. 870 ‘Ob utilizatsionnom sbore v otnoshenii 
kolesnykh transportnykh sredstv’]].
93  Federal Law ‘on the Production and Consumption wastes,’ Art. 24.1(6) (as amended by the Federal 
Law No. 128-FZ).
94  Bill No. 11437 of November 19, 2012, put before the Verkhovna rada [Проект Закону від 19 жовтня 
2012 р. № 11443 «Про внесення змін до статті 47 Закону України «Про охорону навколишнього 
природного середовища» (щодо утилізаційного збору)» [Proekt Zakonu vіd 19 zhovtnya 2012 g. 
No. 11443 ‘Pro vnesennya zmіn do stattі 47 Zakonu Ukrayiny “Pro okhoronu navkolishn’ogo prirodnogo 
seredovishcha” (shchodo utylіzatsіinogo zboru)’]]. this did not pass into law.
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of international law – i.e. the treaty establishing the FtZ – by means of another 
violation, in order to bring russia back within the bounds of legality and re-establish 
the conventional balance. Belarus was – as it frequently is – more measured and 
understanding. Indeed, on July 16, when the russian Federal Law was about to be 
voted upon, the Council of the EurAsEC Commission adopted a decision seeking 
to legalise the principle of a tax on recycling within the Community.95 Very shortly 
thereafter, on october 12, the same Council of the EurAsEC Commission, following an 
impact study on the russian tax, adopted the decision fully approving the scheme.96 
It is therefore quite possible that Belarus will soon align herself completely with 
russian law. this likelihood is far illusory inasmuch as Belarus has applied for a loan 
from the Anti-Crisis Fund and is therefore positioning as herself as an applicant vis-
à-vis russia.97 Furthermore, the russian minister for trade and industry suggested on 
April 11, 2013, that the scheme be extended to the entire Customs union.98
the ‘recycling tax’ episode is far from over and stands as a revealing example 
of a trend in russian normative expansionism. this is the highest degree of 
normative influence whereby the russian Federation manages to impose her rules 
in contravention of commitments to which she voluntarily subscribed shortly before. 
It must be added that there is, in reality, a double violation. openly discriminatory, 
the russian provisions breach not only the rules provided in her regional economic 
alliances, but also disregard those of the wto, which russia joined on August 22, 
2012. Furthermore, the European union has expressed considerable concern and 
is currently threatening russia with dispute resolution proceedings before the 
95  Cf. decision No. 55 of July 16, 2012, ‘on the Application by Belarus and kazakhstan of Import duties 
other than the Customs duties of the Customs union with regard to Certain Categories of goods’ 
[Решение от 16 июля 2012 г. № 55 «О применении Республикой Беларусь и Республикой Казахстан 
ставок ввозных таможенных пошлин, отличных от ставок Единого таможенного тарифа 
Таможенного союза, в отношении отдельных категорий товаров» [Reshenie ot 16 iyulya 2012 g. 
No. 55 ‘O primenenii Respublikoi Belarus’ i Respublikoi Kazakhstan stavok vvoznykh tamozhennykh poshlin, 
otlichnykh ot stavok Edinogo tamozhennogo tarifa Tamozhennogo soyuza, v otnoshenii otdel’nykh 
kategorii tovarov’]].
96  Cf. decision No. 84 of october 12, 2012, ‘on the results of the Monitoring of the Application of 
the recycling tax in russia with regard to Vehicles with Customs union goods status Imported 
from Belarus and kazakhstan’ [Решение Совета Евразийской экономической комиссии от 12 ок- 
тября 2012 г. № 84 «О результатах мониторинга администрирования утилизационного сбора 
в Российской Федерации в отношении транспортных средств, ввозимых из Республики Беларусь 
и Республики Казахстан и имеющих статус товаров Таможенного союза» [Reshenie Soveta Evraziiskoi 
ekonomicheskoi komissii ot 12 oktyabrya 2012 g. No. 84 ‘O rezul’tatakh monitoringa administrirovaniya 
utilizatsionnogo sbora v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii transportnykh sredstv, vvozimykh iz Respubliki 
Belarus’ i Respubliki Kazakhstan i imeyushchikh status tovarov Tamozhennogo soyuza’]]. It provides, in 
particular – and very fortunately – that ‘[t]he parties guarantee that vehicles imported into the territory 
of the russian Federation from the territory of Belarus and of the republic of kazakhstan by natural 
persons, subject to the payment of customs duties as required in the territory of these parties, are 
not subject to the tax on recycling in the russian Federation.’
97  on russia’s strategic place in the Anti-Crisis Fund, cf. supra.
98  Cf. the dispatch issued by Interfax in Belarus on the following website: <http://www.interfax.by/news/
belarus/128413> (accessed Mar. 6, 2015).
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wto.99 In this respect, we could well ask whether the case illustrates the limits of 
russian normative expansion. Endowed as they are within limited powers of political 
resistance, Belarus and ukraine can only put up marginal resistance to the russian 
strategy of legal influence. russia’s most influential partners, like the European union, 
will not hesitate in demanding that she respect the law to which she has freely 
subscribed and in using various forms of political and economic pressure against 
her. decidedly, the study of normative influence is indeed that of the meeting point 
between law and power, whatever the country or organisation resorting to it.
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